Amidst the ongoing U.S.-Israel-led war against Iran, the WJC Technology and Human Rights Institute (TecHRI) identified a viral, repeated incitement trend on Arabic Facebook that takes the form of a poll or voting-style post asking: “Do you support destroying/burning Tel Aviv completely? ◯ Yes ◯ No.” The words “burning” (إحراق) and “Tel Aviv” (تل أبيب) are written with deliberate character substitution, dots and dashes inserted mid-word, to evade Meta’s automated Arabic-language classifiers.
The majority of pages driving this trend display explicit Iranian-aligned branding; Iranian flag profile pictures, IRGC-adjacent iconography, glorification of Khamenei and other IRGC leaders, and tag lines such as “follow us 🇮🇷.” Then, the content is being reposted into pro-Iran groups with large numbers of members for further reach.
Many of these posts use AI-generated images and videos depicting missile barrages striking Israeli cities, designed to make the call to violence feel both vivid and inevitable. The visual framing pairs directly with the textual question, converting a static image into an invitation to publicly endorse mass violence.
The poll format functions as a mobilization tool. It solicits public affirmation of mass violence and harvests thousands of users wishing to provide it. The tens of thousands of comments under these posts read as a public catalogue of eliminationist intent. Representative examples drawn directly from the documented posts:
From a small sample of just 14 documented posts, the template generated approximately 138,000 reactions, 48,000 comments, and 3,100 shares — roughly 190,000 engagement signals. At standard Facebook engagement-to-reach ratios, the reach of this sample alone runs into the tens of millions. The actual circulation of the template across Arabic Facebook is many times larger.
Notably, this content is not appearing randomly across Arabic Facebook. It is being pushed mostly from accounts and pages openly branded with Iranian symbols; flags, IRGC-adjacent imagery, Iran-affiliated tag lines, and then re-posted into large pro-Iran groups for further reach.
The trend is also being injected into large pro-Iran Facebook groups for additional amplification. As one indicative sample, we identified four such groups with a combined membership approaching two million users, with at least several dozen comparable groups carrying the same content. This pattern, combined with the page-level branding, might indicate coordinated rather than organic distribution.
The Tel Aviv poll trend did not appear in isolation. The same monitoring period registered an extreme wave of antisemitic and genocidal content on Arabic Facebook. The two examples below come from the same account, which itself points to a structural problem: Meta's weak enforcement allows the same accounts to repeatedly post clearly violating content without any action, letting them continue to operate and to amplify further incitement.
An April 26, 2026 post paired AI-generated imagery of kneeling Israeli soldiers with an explicit theological argument that, upon “the ultimate victory over the Jews,” the only fitting religious judgment is to slaughter the men and take the women as captives (sex slaves), citing the historical precedent of Khaybar. This is direct and public incitement to genocide and to sexual violence as a tool of genocide.

A separate post from the same page, dated March 12, 2026, shared video of a grieving Israeli woman at the funeral of a loved one killed in the conflict, with a caption that read: “By Allah, I truly hate funerals, except for the funerals of the Zionists; I wish they would be wiped out to the very last man.” Neither post had been removed at the time of writing.
