Manufacturing & Exporting Hatred Toward Israel and the Demonization of Jews

How Antisemitic Hatred Manufactured in Arabic Spheres Infects Global Discourse 

“The Jewish state is facing rockets of disinformation every minute of every day.” — Ronald S. Lauder, President, World Jewish Congress, June 1st, 2026

Executive Summary 

On 1 June 2026, a verified X account run by a self-identified Moroccan user posted a 1-minute-28-second CCTV clip with the Arabic caption “Moment of Israeli shelling of a children’s nursery in southern Lebanon.” Within 48 hours the post had 4.1 million views, 45,000 likes, 20,000 reposts, 4,800 bookmarks, and a thousand replies on the originating post alone. Reposts, from different continents, in Arabic, English, Spanish, Portuguese, and other languages, added several million further impressions over the same window.

The footage in the clip is authentic, but the framing is not. The CCTV timestamp, visible throughout the clip, reads 25 August 2025: more than nine months before the post. The strike that happened during the footage (although not visible in the footage) was a drone hit on a vehicle on the Ain Mizrab road in Tebnine in the Nabatieh Governorate’s Bint Jbeil District, not on the nursery. Lebanon’s National News  Agency, citing the Health Ministry’s Emergency Operations Center, reported a single fatality. The IDF identified the target as a Hezbollah operative engaged in restoring military infrastructure near Beit Lif; Hezbollah-affiliated channels confirmed the death of Hussain Ahmad Baddah, nom de guerre “Ammar.” Two days after the strike, Al Jazeera Mubasher, which originally circulated the CCTV, wrote in its own report that “the nursery sections were not damaged and none of the children or workers were injured.”

Within 48 hours, this verified clarification had not travelled with the footage. What did travel was the false framing. The June 2026 wave of amplification produced explicit eliminationist rhetoric in Arabic, Holocaust comparisons in Spanish, classical religious-antisemitic tropes in English, “Nazi Zionist” labelling in Portuguese, and existential calls against Israel’s continued existence across multiple languages. Several of the loudest amplifiers carry verification badges. One self-identifies as an independent journalist with a six-figure follower count. When the originating post was reported to X, its automated systems found no rule violation and left it online, disinformation with this reach and these consequences cleared platform review untouched and continued to generate more hatred.

That is the mechanism this case study is about. Hatred can be manufactured in one language sphere, where the corrective facts also sit untouched, and then exported to audiences who never encounter those facts and have little way of finding them. This particular post went up less than 40 minutes before WJC President Ronald S. Lauder warned that the Jewish state faces rockets of disinformation every minute of every day. What follows reconstructs the full chain: what happened, how it was reframed, who carried it forward, and what it shows about how fast antisemitic disinformation now moves between languages and continents. This is one case. The same pattern repeats every day.

I. What actually happened: Tebnine, 25 August 2025 

At approximately 10:24 local time on Monday, 25 August 2025, an Israeli drone struck a vehicle on the Ain Mizrab–Tebnine road, in a locality identified by Lebanese reporting as Rabid, on the outskirts of the town of Tebnine in Bint Jbeil district, southern Lebanon. The Health Ministry’s Emergency Operations Center, cited by Lebanon’s National News Agency, reported one fatality. Lebanese outlets imlebanon.org, LBCI, and Lebanon24 carried matching accounts the same day. 

The IDF stated the target was a Hezbollah operative working to restore military infrastructure near Beit Lif. Hezbollah-affiliated social media later announced the death of Hussain Ahmad Baddah, known by the nom de guerre “Ammar,” from Beit Lif. His brother Mohammad had been a Hezbollah commander killed in Syria in 2013.

The Nursery

On 27 August 2025, two days after the strike, Al Jazeera Mubasher published the CCTV under the Arabic headline “Watch: An Israeli strike spreads terror in a children’s nursery in southern Lebanon.” In the same article, the outlet wrote explicitly, in Arabic: 

"According to the video footage, the nursery sections were not damaged and none of the children or workers were injured."

This clarification, published by a pro-Palestinian outlet with no incentive to minimise harm to Lebanese children, establishes the baseline against which the June 2026 reframing must be evaluated. 

II. The Manufactured Frame: the 1 June 2026 post 

Nine months and seven days after the Tebnine strike, on 1 June 2026 at 15:38 (GMT+3) time, a verified X account using the display name “المغربي الرادع” (“The Moroccan Deterrent”) handle @Rd_fas1, posted the CCTV footage with the Arabic caption, “لحظة قصف اسرائيل لروضة أطفال جنوب لبنان” “Moment of Israeli shelling of a children’s nursery in southern Lebanon.” 

Figure 1. The originating post, @Rd_fas1, 1 June 2026. Engagement at capture: 4.1M views, 45K likes, 20K reposts, 4.8K bookmarks, 1K replies, all under 48 hours.

What the framing does 

The short caption restructures the event in two ways. A drone strike on a terrorist's vehicle on the road becomes "shelling of a nursery," and the nursery becomes the main object of the strike. The named Hezbollah operative killed in the strike disappears from the post entirely, and the strike is depicted as targeting children. Neither reframing holds up against the original Arabic-language source: Al Jazeera Mubasher's 27 August 2025 article kept the actual target and the explicit statement that the nursery building was not damaged and no children or staff were injured. The 1 June post drops both.

III. The Source Account: @Rd_fas1

The originating account is not a casual user. It is a verified account on X (verification badge since July 2024), with a stated account base in Europe per X’s own account-info disclosure, and operated by a self-identified Moroccan user. The display name combines the Moroccan flag, an inverted red triangle (the symbol originated in Hamas's al-Qassam Brigades channels, where it was used to mark targets, it’s now widely used by their supporters to identify, harass, and target Israelis, glorify Hamas's terror, and call for increased violence against the Jewish people) and a Palestinian flag. 

The account’s pinned post (Figure 2 below) is a 3-minute-2-second video featuring Abu Obeida, the popular masked spokesperson of the al-Qassam Brigades, praising the Brigades’ weapons stockpile, training programmes, and, by accompanying imagery, the 7 October 2023 attacks on Israel. That single pinned post has accrued 2.1 million views. The account’s prevailing content stream consists of similar material: glorification of Hamas leadership and al-Qassam fighters, footage of attacks against Israel and the IDF, and dehumanizing rhetoric directed at Jews and Israelis, including the recurring pig epithet, a pattern WJC TecHRI has documented across the Arabic-language Facebook and X ecosystems.

Figure 2. Pinned post of @Rd_fas1. Abu Obeida and al-Qassam Brigades content, 2.1M views.

The account profile matters here as context, not as commentary. The 1 June 2026 nursery post did not appear in a vacuum. It came from an account whose content stream is a dedicated channel for Hamas-aligned material and content hostile to Israel and to Jews. The verification badge brings reach. The reach meets the chain of reposts documented below.

IV. Arabic-language Amplification: From decontextualised  footage to eliminationist rhetoric 

Within the Arabic-language portion of the reposts, the most consistent rhetorical pattern is the conversion of the false framing into explicit eliminationist statements. The example below, from @AhmedGhaffar (“El Gaffer”), quote-reposting the original on 2 June 2026, is representative:

Figure 3. @AhmedGhaffar quote-reposting the originating post, 2 June 2026. Arabic caption translates as: “Even if we finish them off a thousand times, it still wouldn’t be enough!” 

The phrasing "even if we finish them off a thousand times, it still wouldn't be enough!" is a direct expression of intent to annihilate. It is not a complaint about Israeli policy. It is a stated wish that the prior “finishing” of the imagined collective subject had been more thorough. Decontextualized footage of distressed children, presented as evidence of an Israeli attack on a nursery, is the catalyst that renders this kind of rhetoric superficially defensible. The reposter is framing themselves as morally outraged on behalf of victims, while the underlying claim is false and the response is eliminationist. 

This is the mechanism: the false framing manufactures the emotional license; the eliminationist response then borrows that license. Both halves of the transaction rest on the listener never checking the underlying facts.

V. The Western Amplification: How the framing crossed languages, audiences, and into antisemitism 

A consequential dimension is what happened when the framing crossed into English, Spanish, Portuguese, and many other languages. Within the same 48-hour window, the false framing generated amplification across several countries in Europe, North America, and South America. The reposts cluster into distinct rhetorical patterns of Antisemitism.

5.1 Political-mobilization framings (English) 

An English-language repost from the US-based account "Erica, The White Trash Socialist" converted the false claim into electoral pressure, framing support for Israel as the single decisive criterion for the reposter’s vote.

Figure 4. US account @herosnvrdie69 (“Erica, The White Trash Socialist”) reposting the originating post, 2 June 2026. 

A second English-language repost, from @EthanLevins2, self-identified as an independent journalist with a six-figure follower count, carried the false framing into the security-policy register, calling for the disarmament of the Israeli military. 

Figure 5. @EthanLevins2 reposting the originating post, 1 June 2026. 

Neither account checked the facts. Neither links to or references the Arabic-language reporting. The reach of the second account, in particular, places this framing in front of an audience that will reasonably regard a verified independent-journalist source as a credible filter.

5.2 Holocaust comparisons and “Nazi” labelling (Spanish and Portuguese) 

Two reposts from Latin American accounts deployed Holocaust-comparison language and “Nazi” labelling. Both correspond directly to a category captured in the IHRA working definition of antisemitism: “drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.”

Figure 6. @icardo8 (Argentina), reposting with Spanish caption

The post does three things. It calls Israel worse than Hitler, inverting the Holocaust. It demands global ostracism. It tells New York not to hold its Israel Day Parade. The last move is the one worth noticing. The demand has shifted off the Israeli government and onto the public expression of Jewish life in another country.

Figure 7. @pedropithan (Brazil), reposting with Portuguese caption

5.3 Classic religious antisemitism (English) 

The most explicitly antisemitic content in the documented cascade was posted by @Haqiqatjou, a US-based account with a long-running output of anti-Jewish theological content:

Figure 8. @Haqiqatjou reposting the originating post, 2 June 2026. 

The caption “Mass killing non-Jewish nursery school children is a religious obligation in Judaism” is not a policy critique. It is the ascription of mass child murder to Jews as a theological imperative. This is the classical blood libel in updated phrasing. It corresponds to the IHRA category capturing “mendacious, dehumanising, demonising, or stereotypical allegations about Jews,” applied to a falsely framed underlying incident. A known blood libel.

5.4 Collective-responsibility conflation: “the Jewish state” 

Figure 9. @RoyalIntel_ reposting the originating post, 1 June 2026. 

The caption opens with the phrasing “the Jewish state of Israel bombs children,” not “Israel bombs children.” The choice attributes the action explicitly to Jews as a collective rather than to the Israeli government as a political actor. It corresponds to the IHRA category capturing the practice of “holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.” The closing framing “your tax dollars are being used to target children’s schools,” compounds the conflation by attaching it to a domestic American political register. 

5.5 Eliminationist anti-Zionism 

Two further reports crossed into the territory of contesting Israel’s right to exist. The IHRA working definition explicitly identifies as antisemitic the denial of “the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour.”

Figure 10. @NateB_Panic reposting the originating post

Figure 11. @Rlkjn22 reposting the originating post in Portuguese

The Portuguese-language repost does something worth noting on its own. Before any reader has a chance to encounter the actual fact pattern (that the target was Hezbollah-affiliated), the post dismisses it in advance as Israeli propaganda. The audience is inoculated against the corrective information before it can arrive.

VI. Pattern analysis 

Looking at the chain of reposts as a single object, five mechanics stand out. None of them is new. Their combination, executed at this speed, is what defines the current environment of the vicious and rapid disinformation campaign against Israel.

1. Recycling Old Footage to Manufacture New Hatred 

Recycling old footage in present-tense framing is a deliberate manufacturing choice. The original incident from August 2025 is stripped of its context and redeployed nine months later as if it just happened. By the time the audience reacts, they are responding to something that has been constructed, not reported. 

2. Linguistic arbitrage

The Arabic source ecosystem already contains the correction. Al Jazeera Mubasher itself stated that the nursery was not damaged and no children were injured. That statement does not cross language barriers. The inflammatory framing does. The Western reposters are not consulting the Arabic-language sources that, in this case, would have corrected them.

3. Rhetorical escalation in transit

The originating Arabic post asserts an attack on a nursery. Downstream Western posts escalate to “worse than Hitler,” to classical religious-antisemitic content, to eliminationist anti-Zionism, to calls against diaspora Jewish public expression. The further the post travels from its source, the more severe the rhetoric attached to it.

4. Asymmetric engagement

The accurate information has not travelled. Not the named target, not the Al Jazeera caveat, not the confirmation from Hezbollah-affiliated channels. The false framing has. Engagement on the misleading post runs many times higher than anything the original, accurate Arabic reporting received. Platform recommendation systems widen the gap further.

5. Verified-account amplification

The originating account has a verification badge. So do several of the Western amplifiers, including a self-identified independent journalist with a six-figure following. In this case the badges are not filtering for quality. They are amplifying disinformation.

6. The platform treated grave disinformation as a non-event.

The originating post was reported to X under its Hateful Conduct and Abuse and Harassment policies. The response: "Our automated systems have determined that a violation of our Rules did not take place." No human review followed, and the post stayed online with its reach increasing. This is the part that should concern policymakers most. A post, coming from an account that explicitly supports a designated terrorist group, recycled old war footage, falsely framed it as an attack on a nursery, and drove eliminationist and IHRA-defined antisemitism across several languages to millions of people around the world, was run through automated enforcement and judged to break no rules. The consequences of this content are real and measurable. The platform's assessment of it was that nothing happened.

VII. Implications 

WJC President Ronald S. Lauder said the Jewish state is facing rockets of disinformation every minute of every day. The line is sometimes read as rhetoric. This case suggests it is closer to a literal description.

A single drone strike, on a named Hezbollah operative with a documented and limited impact, accompanied by an explicit clarification from the pro-Palestinian outlet that first circulated the footage, was put back into circulation nine months later as ammunition for antisemitic mobilisation. Within 48 hours that single piece of decontextualised footage:

This is one case. The pattern itself is daily. Old footage gets pulled back out as if it were current. It is framed in ways the original Arabic-language sources themselves contradict. It is amplified by verified accounts across languages. Within 48 hours it has become antisemitic content, often calling for violence against Jews.

These are not isolated incidents. They are the daily output of a distributed, multilingual production system. Most of the posts in it are not the work of state actors. Each post can generate millions of impressions, cross language barriers in hours, and reliably escalate into antisemitism the further it travels from its source. The information that would defuse each post is, in every case examined here, already available in the original Arabic-language sources. The Western reposters are not consulting it.